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Shake & Bake: Dual-Use Chemicals, Contexts, and the 
Illegality of American White Phosphorus Attacks in Iraq 
JOSEPH D. TESSIER* 
We must never forget that the record on which we judge these de-
fendants today is the record on which history will judge us tomor-
row.  To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our 
own lips as well.1 
I want to say this to America: Either give us help, real help, not in 
speech, or we want a chemical bomb to kill us all, because we are 
suffering too much.2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On November 8, 2005, “Italian public television aired a documentary 
accusing U.S. forces of killing and maiming residents of Fallujah, includ-
ing women and children, with chemical weapons during . . . November 
2004.”3  The New York Times described the documentary as “riddled with 
  
 * J.D. Candidate, Franklin Pierce Law Center, 2008.  The author is a veteran of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom II and a 2002 13D10 graduate of the Fort Sill U.S. Army Field Artillery School.  This note 
was submitted for the Pierce Law Review Annual Symposium.  The author wishes to thank Professor 
William O. Hennessey, Daniel Dargon, members of the Pierce Law Review, and his wife Chelsey for 
their generous assistance while writing this article. 
 1. 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 
101 (1948) (Robert Jackson’s opening address for the United States at Nuremberg). 
 2. Ray Moseley, Refugees Tell U.S.: “Give us help or kill us,” CHI. TRIB., Apr. 9, 1991, at C5 
(quoting Tagreet, an Iraqi female microbiologist, pleading for U.S. help after her village was bombed 
with chemical white phosphorus).  Note that the Chicago Tribune described the white phosphorus 
attack as a chemical attack: 
[A] youth, Khaled Taher, said his family home in Dohuk had been struck by a white phos-
phorus shell.  Only he and his brother, Tariq, survived the chemical attack, he said.  Oint-
ment had been applied to his face and burned hands at an Iraqi hospital, he said, but his face 
was wreathed in quiet suffering. 
Id. 
 3. Darrin Mortenson, Official Waffling on White Phosphorus Fuels Debate Abroad, N. COUNTY 
TIMES (Escondido, Cal.), Nov. 22, 2005, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2005/ 
051122-phosphorus-debate.htm.  On November 16, 2005, Brig. Gen. Donald Alston, U.S. Air Force, 
then Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Communications, and spokesperson, Multi-National Force 
(Baghdad) told CNN: “We have not changed our position that in fact we did not use white phosphorus 
against civilians in Falluja during Operation al-Fajr.”  Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees: Vice President 
Dick Cheney Blasts Democrats over Iraq War Criticism (CNN television broadcast Nov. 16, 2005) 
(transcript on file with Pierce Law Review).  On the same day, however, Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. 
Barry Venable told the Financial Times that civilians had not been targeted but indicated that “[i]t 
 
File: Tessier - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 2 Created on:  12/6/2007 4:39:00 PM Last Printed: 12/7/2007 11:15:00 AM 
324 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 6, No. 2 
 
errors and exaggerations,”4 and “[t]he military called it propaganda.”5  The 
State Department initially responded by saying that the military used white 
phosphorus (WP) “very sparingly in Fallujah, for illumination purposes.”6 
The U.S. Ambassador in London, Robert Holmes Tuttle, publicly 
stated that U.S. forces “do not use napalm or white phosphorus as weap-
ons.”7  Lt. Col. Steve Boylan, director of the Combined Press Information 
Center and spokesman for the U.S. military in Iraq told reporters, “I do not 
recall the use of white phosphorus during the offensive operations in Fallu-
jah in the fall of 2004.”8  On November 10, 2004, it was clarified that 
white phosphorus was used to provide smoke screens, illuminations, and as 
a “psychological weapon” against the enemy.  Pentagon spokesman Lt. 
Col. Barry Venable explained that white phosphorus could also be used as 
an anti-personnel weapon: 
When you have enemy forces that are in covered positions that 
your high explosive artillery rounds are not having an impact on 
and you wish to get them out of those positions, one technique is to 
fire a white phosphorus round into the position because the com-
bined effects of the fire and smoke—and in some cases the terror 
brought about by the explosion on the ground—will drive them out 
of the holes so that you can kill them with high explosives.9 
Similarly, on November 18, 2004, Lieutenant Colonel Boylan told report-
ers in a press conference that “[white phosphorus] is a munition that can be 
used to force people out of locations because of the smoke and the heat.  
  
would not be out of the realm of the possible” that civilians had been killed by white phosphorus.  Guy 
Dinmore, Phosphorus “May Have Killed,” FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 17, 2005, at Americas 12. 
 4. Mortenson, supra note 3 (quoting Scott Shane, Defense of Phosphorus Use Turns into Damage 
Control, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2005, at A14). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Int’l Info. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Did the U.S. Use “Illegal” Weapons in Fallujah?, 
http://usinfo.state.gov/media/Archive_Index/Illegal_Weapons_in_Fallujah.html (last visited Sept. 23, 
2007). 
 7. Paul Reynolds, White Phosphorus: Weapon on the Edge, BBC NEWS, Nov. 16, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4442988.stm.  The American ambassador to Italy, Ronald P. Spo-
gli, also denied that white phosphorus had been used as a weapon by the United States.  Shane, supra 
note 4. 
 8. Phil Stewart, Burning Agent Used in Iraq, Says TV Report, IRISH TIMES (Dublin), Nov. 9, 2005, 
at 12. 
 9. U.S. Forces Used “Chemical Weapon” in Iraq, INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 16, 2005.  In a 
press conference Brig. Gen. Rick Lynch, spokesman for U.S. forces in Baghdad, told reporters, “[w]e 
don’t use munitions of any kind against innocent civilians. . . . In accordance with all established con-
ventions, [white phosphorus] can be used against enemy combatants.”  John Daniszewski & Mark 
Mazzetti, White Phosphorus Use Ignites Debate: Critics Say the U.S. Killed Iraqi Civilians with the 
Incendiary Weapon.  The Pentagon Denies It, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2005, at A1 (alteration in original).  
Col. Dave Lapan, top spokesman for the U.S. Marine force, “maintained that white phosphorus bombs 
could be unleashed on insurgents.”  Mortenson, supra note 3. 
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We always fire it at a military target.  It was a military target in Fallujah.  It 
was against terrorists and insurgents.”10 
Ambassador Tuttle explained to the London Times regarding his earlier 
denial: “We did the best we could with the information we had, but we 
regret that it was not totally accurate.”11  Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, told reporters that he “had no 
knowledge of any civilian victims of attacks with white phosphorus.”12 
On November 29, 2005, in a Department of Defense press conference 
with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Gen. Peter Pace, Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Pace stated that white phosphorus 
“is a legitimate tool of the military,” and can be used for illumination, 
smoke, and incendiary purposes.13  Incredibly, the Department of Defense 
released an addendum to the press conference clarifying that white phos-
phorus was not used as an incendiary weapon.14  According to General 
Pace, “it was well within the law of war to use white phosphorus . . . for 
marking and screening.”15  This was the last official statement on white 
phosphorus.  The chemical’s legality as an anti-personnel weapon within 
the laws of war or the Chemical Weapons Convention was not discussed. 
Despite the Pentagon’s claim that white phosphorus has only been 
used for legitimate purposes (illumination and smoke) in Iraq, there have 
been numerous allegations and accounts by members of the U.S. military, 
war correspondents, and Iraqi civilians that white phosphorus has been 
used as an anti-personnel weapon against Iraqi combatants and civilians 
  
 10. Erin Emery, Coloradan: Incendiary Killed Civilians, DENVER POST, Nov. 18, 2005, at A1.  The 
article further quotes Maj. Todd Vician, a Pentagon spokesman, as saying: “In Fallujah, the insurgents 
were in entrenched lines and small holes, and we could not get at them effectively with our munitions.  
So [white phosphorus shells] were used then to bring the insurgents out of those areas to . . . engage 
them better with the high-explosive munitions.”  Id. (alterations in original). 
 11. Al Kamen, Chemical Reactions, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2005, at A21.  After the Pentagon’s first 
retraction, the American Embassy in London directed “all questions on [white phosphorus]” to the 
Pentagon.  Andrew Buncombe et al., Incendiary Weapons: The Big White Lie: U.S. Finally Admits 
Using White Phosphorus in Fallujah—and Beyond, BELFAST TELEGRAPH, Nov. 17, 2005.  On Novem-
ber 22, 2005, William Burns, U.S. Ambassador to Russia, commented: “On the question of [white] 
phosphorus, we have made clear publicly that we have not undertaken any actions that would violate 
international law, and we have not undertaken any actions against civilians.”  Ambassador Burns’ 
Interview with Gazeta.ru: William Burns, U.S. Ambassador to Russia, Nov. 22, 2005, 
http://moscow.usembassy.gov/bilateral/statement.php? record_id=23. 
 12. U.S. Defends Use of White Phosphorus Against Iraq Insurgents, AFX FIN. NEWS (London), 
Nov. 16, 2005, http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2005/051116-phosphorus-defense.htm (empha-
sis added). 
 13. News Briefing with Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and Gen. Peter Pace (U.S. Dep’t 
of Def. news transcript Nov. 29, 2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005/ 
tr20051129-secdef4361.html. 
 14. Vince Crawly, Top Military Official Calls White Phosphorus “Legitimate Tool,” INT’L INFO. 
PROGRAMS, Dec. 1, 2005, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2005 
&m=December&x=20051201140216mvyelwarc0.787594. 
 15. Id. 
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within urban areas.  This note examines: (1) “Shake & Bake”: the use of 
white phosphorus to flush out combatants from fortified positions so they 
can be killed with conventional munitions;16 (2) the direct use of white 
phosphorus illumination mortars against human targets;17 and (3) the use of 
improvised phosphorus bombs to clear insurgents out of buildings.18 
White phosphorus is an example of a “dual-use” chemical.  As with 
most dual-use chemicals, there are lawful and prohibited purposes.  It is an 
especially legally precarious chemical because there are both legitimate 
and potentially improper military purposes.19  Peter Kaiser, spokesman for 
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (the 
international body responsible for implementation of the Chemical Weap-
ons Convention) has described the prohibited uses of white phosphorus as 
those military purposes that are dependent on the chemical’s toxicity.20  
Thus, the central question of this article asks whether the legality of the 
United States’ intended use of anti-personnel white phosphorus depends on 
the chemical’s toxic properties. 
This note analyzes the legal implications of the cited examples of 
white phosphorus use by looking at the following: (1) general principles of 
international humanitarian law and the necessity defense, (2) the Zyklon B 
case, and (3) the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weap-
ons Convention Implementation Act of 1998. 
II.  GENERAL INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW PRINCIPLES 
There are three core principles of international humanitarian law un-
derlying this analysis.  First, the principle of discrimination requires that 
weapons be employed in a way that discriminates combatants from civil-
ians.  Second, weapons cannot be deployed in such a way as to cause un-
  
 16. See James T. Cobb, The Fight for Fallujah, FIELD ARTILLERY, Mar.–Apr. 2005, at 22, 26, 
available at http://sill-www.army.mil/famag/2005/MAR_APR_2005/PAGE24-30.pdf. 
 17. Christopher L. Budihas, So, You’re Going to Iraq? Company Commander Shares Successful 
Tactics, Techniques, INFANTRY MAG., Sept. 1, 2004, at 23 (“When needed, they [white phosphorus 
illumination mortars] suppressed enemy personnel in the objective area, suppressed personnel attempt-
ing to escape, illuminated the battlefield, and marked targets for rotary-wing air-support.  Due to the 
FOB [forward operating base] being located on the edge of a town, I would periodically (on average 
four times a week) use mortar illumination rounds as pseudo H&I [harassment and interdiction] fires.  
My intent was to not cause any unnecessary local national casualties, but I wanted them to know that 
we were still there and alert.”). 
 18. Earl J. Catagnus, Jr. et al., Infantry Squad Tactics: Some of the Lessons Learned During MOUT 
in the Battle for Fallujah, MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, Sept. 2005, at 80, 88, available at http://www. 
smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/Articles/Infantry%20Squad%20Tactics.pdf. 
 19. See Reynolds, supra note 7. 
 20. See id. 
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necessary suffering.  Third, the prohibition on poison or asphyxiating 
weapons.  These principles are codified in the Law of Land Warfare.21 
Article 22 of the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land stipulates that “[t]he right of belligerents to adopt means of 
injuring the enemy is not unlimited.”22  Article 23 states that it is “espe-
cially forbidden . . . [t]o employ poison or poisoned weapons [or] [t]o em-
ploy arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffer-
ing.”23 
While it is true that weapons are meant to kill and maim, the Law of 
Land Warfare recognizes that some weapons, uses, and tactics are strictly 
prohibited because they violate any or all of these three principles.  Con-
versely, some weapons, uses, and tactics, are perfectly legal and honorable.  
These restrictions are also subject to the principal defense of military ne-
cessity.  Military necessity authorizes the use of military force necessary to 
accomplish the mission.  Thus, a weapon or tactic may cause unnecessary 
suffering and still be lawful because it is the only means that can accom-
plish a military objective.  Nevertheless, military necessity is not a defense 
for acts expressly prohibited by treaty.24 
In 1899, the Hague Gas Declaration declared that “projectiles the sole 
object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases” 
would be illegal under international law.25  The test for this declaration was 
whether toxicity was the dominant effect of the projectile.26  Consequently, 
projectiles that combine both gas and shrapnel would still be lawful pro-
vided that the shrapnel caused the dominant effect of the weapon.  For ex-
ample, in World War I, the Germans employed chlorine projectiles.  Ger-
many argued that the weapon did not violate international law because the 
sole object of the projectile was not “the [d]iffusion of [a]sphyxiating or 
[d]eleterious gases.”27  Under the declaration, a proportional analysis was 
required to determine whether a weapon was a prohibited chemical wea-
pon.28 
  
 21. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1956), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/ 
frd/Military_Law/pdf/law_warfare-1956.pdf. 
 22. Id. at 17 (quoting Annex to the Convention with respect to the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land art. 22, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 403 [hereinafter Annex to the Laws and Customs of 
War]). 
 23. Annex to the Laws and Customs of War, supra note 22, art. 23. 
 24. INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., LAW 
OF WAR HANDBOOK 164–65 (2005), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/law-war-
handbook-2005.pdf. 
 25. Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779, 187 CONSOL. T.S. 
453, available at http://hei.unige.ch/humanrts/instree/1899e.htm. 
 26. INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 254 (2d ed. 2000). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
File: Tessier - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 2 Created on:  12/6/2007 4:39:00 PM Last Printed: 12/7/2007 11:15:00 AM 
328 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 6, No. 2 
 
In 1925, the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of As-
phyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases sought to close this loophole: 
WHEREAS the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other 
gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been 
justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilised world . . . 
TO THE END that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as 
a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the 
practice of nations . . . .29 
The sole purpose criterion was replaced by a prohibition on the use of 
asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases.  Moreover, the 1925 protocol dif-
fered from the 1899 declaration because the restricted chemical weapons 
were not limited to “projectiles,” but rather extended to “materials and 
devices.”  This was particularly important because the Germans in World 
War I initially used chlorine canisters to disrupt enemy trench lines and to 
fortify positions.  Germany had argued that the use of chlorine was not 
illegal because the chemical was contained in canisters and not projec-
tiles.30  Thus, the 1925 protocol further developed the principle of chemical 
weapon prohibition to include devices and materials employed in war, 
where these devices and materials are used for their poisonous and as-
phyxiating properties.  President Ford ratified the 1925 protocol in 1975.31 
A. Toxic Chemicals & the United Nations War Crimes Commission 
1. Zyklon B: Wasch-und Desinfectionsraum 
Hydrogen cyanide or prussic acid (Zyklon B) is probably the quintes-
sential example of a dual-use chemical.  On one hand, vast amounts of 
Zyklon B were shipped to German concentration camps for the benign 
purpose of disinfecting buildings and delousing clothing of interned pris-
oners.  On the other hand, the chemical was the chief toxic gas used to 
“systematically exterminat[e] human beings to an estimated total of six 
million, of whom four and a half million were exterminated by the use of 
Zyklon B in one camp alone, known as Auschwitz/Birkenau.”32 
In the Zyklon B Case, a British military tribunal charged three German 
businessmen, Bruno Tesch, Joachim Drosihn, and Karl Weinbacher with 
  
 29. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and 
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 14 I.L.M. 49 (emphasis added). 
 30. DETTER, supra note 26, at 254. 
 31. Id. 
 32. In re Tesch (Zyklon B Case), 1 Law Rep. of Trials of War Criminals 93, 94 (Brit. Mil. Ct. 1946), 
available at http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/WCC/zyklonb.htm. 
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war crimes, alleging “that they ‘at Hamburg, Germany, between 1st Janu-
ary, 1941, and 31st March, 1945, in violation of the laws and usages of war 
did supply poison gas used for the extermination of allied nationals in-
terned in concentration camps well knowing that the said gas was to be so 
used.’”33 
The prosecution introduced evidence that Tesch was asked about kill-
ing Jews with hydrogen cyanide and recommended that the gas be used in 
enclosed spaces, as was done in exterminating vermin.  The German busi-
nessmen pleaded not guilty.  Counsel for Tesch made the following de-
fenses: 
First, that Tesch had no knowledge of the killing of human beings 
by means of Zyklon B; secondly, that Zyklon B was delivered only 
for normal purposes of disinfection and for medical reasons; third-
ly, that the parts of the gas chambers were sold only for the pur-
pose of exterminating vermin; fourthly, that concentration camps 
got the gas only in amounts which were quite normal in relation to 
the number of inhabitants, and only for killing vermin; and fifthly, 
that instruction courses were held only according to the relevant 
laws and regulations, and again only for the purpose of teaching 
the method of exterminating vermin.34 
Weinbacher’s and Drosihn’s defense was that they had no knowledge 
of the killing of human beings by the poisonous gas until the end of the 
war and that they did not have any reason to believe that Zyklon B was 
being used for anything but the extermination of vermin.  They insisted 
that the Zyklon B was not a weapon and that they had no knowledge of the 
context in which it was being used.35 
The judge advocate argued that to render a verdict against the defen-
dants, the court had to be sure of three facts: “[F]irst, that Allied nationals 
had been gassed by means of Zyklon B; secondly, that this gas had been 
supplied by Tesch and Stabenow; and thirdly, that the accused knew that 
the gas was to be used for the purpose of killing human beings.”36 
The tribunal found Tesch and Weinbacher guilty based on this three-
part test.  Drosihn was a subordinate in the firm and had no knowledge of 
the way the gas was being used.37  Although the tribunal did not have any 
evidence that Weinbacher had knowledge of the illegal use of Zyklon B, 
the court seemed to rely on the fact that he had reason to know based on 
  
 33. Id. at 93 (citation omitted in original). 
 34. Id. at 96. 
 35. Id. at 96–97. 
 36. Id. at 101. 
 37. Id. at 102. 
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his position within the firm.38  Specifically, it was reasonable to infer that 
“a competent business person in a leadership position will know the con-
text behind the major efforts of his business.”39 
2. The Tesch Deception 
Dual-use chemicals and their attendant circumstances are not trivial.  
The specific context, not the abstract non-prohibited purpose, was the le-
gally significant issue that determined whether or not Zyklon B was being 
used as a chemical weapon to kill allied nationals.  Killing vermin, clean-
ing, and disinfecting were merely smokescreens to conceal and distract 
from the terror that had occurred within the dual-context of the gas cham-
bers at Auschwitz.  The dual-use, dual-context argument was a deliberate 
ploy by Germany to avoid international criticism and war crime liability.  
During the Nuremberg Trials, Justice Jackson engaged in the following 
exchange with Albert Speer (Germany’s Minister for Armaments during 
World War II), asking why Germany had chosen not to use its vast stock-
piles of deadly gases: 
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And your reasons, I take it, were the 
same as the military’s, that is to say, it was certain Germany would 
get the worst of it if Germany started that kind of warfare.  That is 
what was worrying the military, wasn’t it? 
SPEER: No, not only that.  It was because at that stage of the war 
it was perfectly clear that under no circumstances should any in-
ternational crimes be committed which could be held against the 
German people after they had lost the war.  That was what decided 
the issue.40 
So according to Speer, concern of being held for international crimes 
was the reason for the Nazis not using the deadly gases Sarin and Tabun.  
It is important to note that the concern not to use obvious chemical weap-
ons did not stop the Nazis from improperly using common lawful chemi-
cals—carbon monoxide (Death Vans) and a pesticide (Zyklon B)—within 
enclosed spaces to kill human beings.  
These historical lessons illustrate the principal need to evaluate the le-
gality of weapons or methods of warfare in the context in which they are 
  
 38. Kyle Rex Jacobson, Doing Business with the Devil: The Challenges of Prosecuting Corporate 
Officials Whose Business Transactions Facilitate War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 56 A.F. 
L. REV. 167, 194 (2005). 
 39. Id. at 195. 
 40. 16 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 
528 (1948). 
File: Tessier - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 2 Created on: 12/6/2007 4:39:00 PM Last Printed: 12/7/2007 11:15:00 AM 
2007 SHAKE & BAKE 331 
 
being applied rather than in abstract isolation.41  This is particularly impor-
tant when evaluating weapons that possess poison or asphyxiating capabili-
ties.42  Article 36 of the Geneva Convention recognizes this principle by 
stating that the legality of weapons or methods of warfare is evaluated “in 
some or all circumstances.”43  Thus, the purpose for which the weapon was 
used is the controlling legal principle.  Fundamentally, a “context-based” 
approach44 makes intended or initial design of the weapon incidental to the 
analysis. 
This principle is crucial in chemical weapons proliferation because the 
modern economy depends of an array of toxic chemicals for industry.  
Common chemicals can be combined or improperly used in such a context 
which would transform a seemingly benign chemical into a chemical wea-
pon.  A chemical need not be manufactured or labeled as “chemical weap-
ons” in order to be, in certain circumstances, a chemical weapon under 
international law.  For example, the U.S. Army field manual on urban 
combat cautions that lawfully possessed chemicals such as ammonia, chlo-
rine, and sulfuric and phosphoric acids pose toxic threats for both state and 
non-state actors.45 
B. The Chemical Weapons Convention: “Never Under Any Circum-
stances” 
1. Definition of a Chemical Weapon: Toxic Chemicals 
The Chemical Weapons Convention46 (CWC) was established in rec-
ognition of the danger posed by chemical weapons and the ease by which 
  
 41. See James D. Fry, Contextualized Legal Reviews for the Methods and Means of Warfare: Cave 
Combat and International Humanitarian Law, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 453, 455 (2006) (“con-
text-based legal reviews of methods and means of warfare can help close loopholes and ensure that the 
spirit of these [international humanitarian] laws prevails”). 
 42. Id. at 456. 
 43. Id. at 468–69 (citing Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 36, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391, available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/y5pagc.htm). 
 44. See id. at 480. 
 45. U.S. ARMY, COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN, FIELD MANUAL 3-06.11 
(2002), available at https://atiam.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/9629-1/fm/3-06.11 
/fm3_06x11.pdf.  See also Jonathan P. Edwards, The Iraqi Oil “Weapon” in the 1991 Gulf War: A Law 
of Armed Conflict Analysis, 40 NAVAL L. REV. 105, 130 (1992) (concluding that the igniting of Ku-
waiti oil fields constituted a violation of the law of war). 
 46. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemi-
cal Weapons and on their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-
21, 32 I.L.M. 800, available at http://www.opcw.org/docs/cwc_eng.pdf [hereinafter Chemical Weap-
ons Convention].  The treaty entered into force for the United States and other original signers on April 
25, 1997.  Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Membership of the OPCW (2007), 
http://www.opcw.org/html/db/members_ratifyer.html [hereinafter OPCW Membership]. 
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commercial chemicals could be employed as weapons or in the making of 
weapons.  Under Article I, section 1, “[e]ach State Party to th[e] Conven-
tion undertakes never under any circumstances . . . to use chemical weap-
ons.”47  Article I, section 5 states that “[e]ach State Party undertakes not to 
use riot control agents as a method of warfare.”48  Unlike the Law of Land 
Warfare, the CWC does not contain an exception for military necessity.49  
Both the CWC and the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementa-
tion Act of 199850 (CWCIA) define chemical weapons to include “toxic 
chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not 
prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are 
consistent with such purposes.”51 
Article II, section 2 of the CWC defines “toxic chemical” as: 
Any chemical which through its chemical action on life proc-
esses can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm 
to humans or animals.  This includes all such chemicals, regardless 
of their origin or of their method of production, and regardless of 
whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or else-
where.52 
Article II, section 9 of the CWC lists purposes not prohibited, which 
include “[m]ilitary purposes not connected with the use of chemical weap-
ons and not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a 
method of warfare.”53 
Section 229F(7)(C) defines purposes not prohibited as “[a]ny military 
purpose of the United States that is not connected with the use of a chemi-
cal weapon or that is not dependent on the use of the toxic or poisonous 
properties of the chemical weapon to cause death or harm.”54 
Section 229 describes unlawful conduct as follows: (1) any person 
knowingly using any chemical weapon; or (2) assisting or inducing, in any 
way, any person to use such chemical weapon.55  Further, exempted per-
sons include “any . . . member of the Armed Forces . . . who is authorized 
by law or by an appropriate officer of the United States to retain, own, pos-
  
 47. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 46. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Compare THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 21, at 179, with Chemical Weapons Con-
vention, supra note 46. 
 50. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681–2856 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6701–71 
(2006)). 
 51. Id. § 3(1)(A), 22 U.S.C. § 6701(1)(A); Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 46, art. II, § 
1(A). 
 52. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 46, art. II, § 2. 
 53. Id. § 9(c). 
 54. Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act § 229F(7)(C), 22 U.S.C. § 6701(8)(C). 
 55. Id. § 229(a), 18 U.S.C. § 229(a). 
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sess, transfer, or receive the chemical weapon.”56  However, the exemption 
does not apply to the use of chemical weapons.57 
The United States has jurisdiction when the use of chemical weapons 
“takes place outside of the United States and is committed by a national of 
the United States.”58  In general, criminal penalties require that a person59 
who uses a chemical weapon be “fined, or imprisoned for any terms of 
years, or both.”60  Moreover, any person who uses chemical weapons by 
which “the death of another person is the result shall be punished by death 
or imprisoned for life.”61  This provision also allows for civil penalties 
upon proof of such violation by a preponderance of the evidence.62 
It is important to note that the CWC and the CWCIA recognize the 
knowing use of a toxic chemical as a method of warfare against a human 
being as an unlawful use of a chemical weapon.  Moreover, under federal 
law, members of the U.S. armed forces outside the United States are not 
exempt from using toxic chemicals connected with the use of the chemi-
cal’s toxic or poisonous properties to cause death or harm of a human be-
ing.63  It is also important to note that the statute and treaty do not use the 
terms “dominant” or “sole” but rather “connected” and “dependent” re-
spectively.  This is a critical difference between the CWC and the propor-
tionality analysis required under the 1899 Hague Gas Declaration.  Again, 
since the use of a toxic chemical as a method of warfare is expressly pro-
hibited by treaty there can be no defense of necessity under the laws of 
war. 
2. Chemicals Subject to Inspection 
The CWC also specifically lists three schedules of chemicals as well as 
a broad class of chemicals called Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals 
(UDOCs), which are subject to inspection by the OPCW.64  This list is 
  
 56. Id. § 229(b)(2)(A). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. § 229(c)(2). 
 59. Id. § 3(6), 22 U.S.C. § 6701 (“The term ‘person,’ except as otherwise provided, means any 
individual, corporation, partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, public or private institution, any 
State or any political subdivision thereof, or any political entity within a State, any foreign government 
or nation or any agency, instrumentality or political subdivision of any such government or nation, or 
other entity located in the United States.”). 
 60. Id. § 229A(a)(1), 18 U.S.C. § 229A(a)(1). 
 61. Id. § 229A(a)(2). 
 62. Id. § 229A(b)(1). 
 63. Id. § 229. 
 64. ORGANIZATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, FACT SHEET 4: WHAT IS A 
CHEMICAL WEAPON? (2000), http://www.opcw.org/docs/fs4.pdf [hereinafter OPCW FACT SHEET]. 
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sometimes incorrectly interpreted as being a list of prohibited chemicals.65  
The stringency of these schedules decrease as the likelihood of improper 
use as an agent of warfare decreases.  Schedule 1 chemicals “are known as 
chemical warfare agents with little or no other uses.”  These include agents 
such as VX (nerve) and mustard gas.  Schedule 2 consists of chemicals 
with the potential to be used as chemical weapons but which also have 
legitimate uses.  Schedule 3 chemicals have potential for use as chemical 
weapons but also have substantial industrial uses.  These include chemicals 
such as phosgene and hydrogen cyanide (the main ingredient in Zyklon 
B).66  UDOCs include all compounds of carbon (except its oxides, sulfides, 
and metal carbonates).  Within UDOCs, PSF chemicals (chemicals con-
taining phosphorus, sulfur, or fluorine) are subject to more stringent con-
trols.67  Nevertheless, any toxic chemical’s use as a method of warfare 
would be prohibited regardless of it being a chemical subject to inspection. 
3. UDOCs 
Although the first of the three inspection schedules covers more infa-
mous chemicals, it does not cover others like chlorine, which has numer-
ous legitimate uses in the economy.  However, chlorine falls under the 
UDOC category in the CWC.  Interestingly, chlorine was one of the first 
chemicals used in warfare in modern times.68 
In World War I, the Germans employed toxic chlorine gas against en-
trenched French and Canadian forces.  They buried 168 metric tons of 
chlorine gas and released it where the wind carried to the Allies in the 
trenches.69  The fog frightened the troops and they “experienced violent 
nausea, asphyxiation, blindness, and agonizing pain.  Within thirty min-
utes, the toxic gas had caused 15,000 casualties and 5,000 deaths, leading 
to the collapse of two entire French divisions.”70  Many felt that the Ger-
  
 65. Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. Barry Venable misinterpreted the inspection schedule to be an 
exclusive list of prohibited chemicals.  See U.S. Used White Phosphorus in Iraq, BBC NEWS, Nov. 16, 
2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4440664.stm [hereinafter White Phosphorus].  Any 
toxic chemical used as a method of warfare would be prohibited under the CWC. 
 66. See Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 46, Annex on Chemicals. 
 67. See Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Determining Declarable Industrial 
Activities, http://www.opcw.org/html/db/chemind_declarable.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2007). 
 68. Timothy K. Webster, The Future of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T, Winter 2002, at 187, 188, available at http://www.abanet.org/environ/pubs/nre/ 
specissue/webster.pdf. 
 69. Id. at 196. 
 70. See Jonathan B. Tucker, Introduction to THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: 
IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 1, 1 (Jonathan B. Tucker ed., 2001) (citing Jonathan 
B. Tucker, From Arms Race to Abolition: The Evolving Norm Against Biological and Chemical War-
fare, in THE NEW TERROR: FACING THE THREAT OF BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS 159, 159–
226 (Sidney D. Drell et al. eds., 1999)). 
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mans had found a way to break the trenches.  Germany’s use of chemical 
warfare prompted retaliation by the Allies and new agents like phosgene 
and mustard gas were developed.71 
However, the inception of chemical warfare goes back even further.  
The first use of chemical weapons in ancient times occurred from 429 BC 
to 424 BC with the Spartan sieges of Plataea and Delium during the Pelo-
ponnesian Wars.  In 423 BC, the Spartans took an Athenian-held fort by 
directing poisonous fumes from burning pitch and sulfur and channeling 
them into the fighting positions occupied by Athenian combatants.72 
In recognition that commonly used industrial products could be con-
verted to serve illegitimate purposes, the drafters of the CWC included a 
broad category of chemicals called UDOCs (Unscheduled Discrete Or-
ganic Compounds). 
The CWC would seemingly close the loopholes of dual-use UDOC 
agents like the Germans’ use of chlorine.  It would also prohibit the use of 
toxic sulfur fumes to dislodge troops (as in the Spartan sieges). 
4. Quasi-Chemical RCAs 
Riot Control Agents (RCAs) are defined as chemicals not listed in an 
inspection schedule “which can produce rapidly in humans sensory irrita-
tion or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time fol-
lowing termination of exposure.”73   
Under the CWC, the state parties agree not to use RCAs as a method of 
warfare.  If a state party believes that an RCA has been used against it as a 
method of warfare, it has the right to request assistance from the OPCW.74  
However, it is important to note for this analysis that Iraq is not a party to 
the CWC.  Nevertheless, this does not eliminate U.S. obligations under the 
treaty and U.S. law. 
5. Interpretations of Method of Warfare: “A Special Killing Equation” 
The use of RCAs was a topic of considerable debate during the CWC 
negotiations.  Specifically, the convention gave no indication as to what 
methods of warfare meant.  Despite this gray area, there is agreement that a 
  
 71. Id. 
 72. Fry, supra note 41, at 453. 
 73. ORGANIZATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, DECLARATION HANDBOOK FOR 
THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING AND USE 
OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION § K (2002), http://www.opcw.org/handbook/ 
html/sec_k.html. 
 74. OPCW FACT SHEET, supra note 64. 
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method of warfare would include the use of an RCA to amplify the use of 
lethal force.75 
Dr. Matthew Meselson, testifying before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee regarding the CWC, gave an example of a method of warfare in 
which RCAs would be used to “drive personnel from protective cover into 
the line of ground fire or bombing, to disrupt their operations and other-
wise as multipliers of lethal force.”76  Similarly, Dr. Amy Smithson testi-
fied before Congress, during the ratification, that the “law of war describes 
a method of warfare as a way to attain military objectives.  According to 
this definition, flushing enemy soldiers from foxholes into the line of fire, 
or launching an RCA attack on an enemy command post easily qualify as 
method of warfare uses.”77 
Moreover, the Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin pointed out 
that non-lethal RCAs have been historically employed as a lethal method 
of warfare: 
Police gases extensively used in war include ethyl bromoace-
tate and congeners in the first World War; agent CN in Ethiopia 
(from December 1935), China (from late 1937) and the Yemen 
(1963); and agent CS in the Vietnam War and the Iraq-Iran war.  
In each case, these agents were used mainly or entirely not to 
avoid the use of conventional firepower but in conjunction with it, 
as a force multiplier.  Moreover, starting in World War I, combat 
use of such gases preceded every significant outbreak of lethal 
chemical warfare.78 
Detter, in The Law of War, notes that historically many states used 
chemical or biological weapons in their colonization processes: 
After the establishment of colonies it became common to use 
CBW (Chemical/Biological Weapons) against insurgents, for ex-
ample to drive them out of caves or hiding places, as did the 
French in Algeria in the middle of the last century.  There is no 
doubt the British used gas in the Boer War.79 
According to Harper, employment of RCAs “in advance of lethal wea-
pons, whether chemical or conventional, against enemy troops, positions 
  
 75. Ernest Harper, A Call for a Definition of Method of Warfare in Relation to the Chemical Weap-
ons Convention, 48 NAVAL L. REV. 132, 133 (2001). 
 76. Id. at 156. 
 77. Id. at 149 (emphasis added). 
 78. Id. 
 79. DETTER, supra note 26, at 252.  
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and equipment is the archetypal use [of RCAs] as a method of warfare.”80  
His analysis concludes with a possible definition: “Riot Control Agents are 
a method of warfare when used to systematically enable or multiply the use 
of lethal force against hostile enemies,” but not when meant to save lives.81  
Moreover, he suggests that “when used in conjunction with lethal weapons, 
RCA is a method of warfare even if the targets are civilians.”82 
6. Use of Chemicals Authorized Against Iraqis 
I am strongly in favor of using poisoned gas against uncivilised 
tribes.  The moral effect should be so good that the loss of life 
should be reduced to a minimum.  It is not necessary to use only 
the most deadly gasses: gasses can be used which cause great in-
convenience and would spread a lively terror and yet would leave 
no serious permanent effects on most of those affected.83 
On February 5, 2003 (the same day that Secretary of State Colin Pow-
ell appeared before the United Nations describing Iraq’s deceptive Chemi-
cal Weapons Program),84 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld appeared 
before the House Arms Committee and said that absent a presidential 
waiver, U.S. troops would not be able to use RCAs in combat: “In many 
instances our forces are allowed to shoot somebody and kill them, but they 
are not allowed to use a nonlethal riot agent under the law.”85 
In April 2003, President Bush authorized the U.S. military to use tear 
gas in Iraq.86  According to the Pentagon, tear gas was issued to American 
troops and would only be used to save civilian lives in accordance with the 
executive order and the CWC.87  As of April 30, 2003 Defense Department 
officials interpreted the CWC to mean that chemicals would be allowed to 
subdue Iraqis “for their own safety or to defend U.S. troops.”88 
  
 80. Harper, supra note 75, at 149–50. 
 81. Id. at 158–59. 
 82. Id. at 150. 
 83. Centre for Research on Globalisation, Winston Churchill’s Secret Poison Gas Memo (quoting 
Memorandum from Winston Churchill (May 12, 1919), in 4 MARTIN GILBERT, WINSTON S. 
CHURCHILL (1976)), available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/CHU407A.html. 
 84. Colin Powell, U.S. Sec’y of State, Iraq Denial and Deception: Address Before the U.N. Sec. 
Council (Feb. 5, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-
1.html. 
 85. Kerry Boyd, Rumsfeld Wants to Use Riot Control Agents in Combat, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, 
Mar. 2003, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_03/nonlethal_mar03.asp. 
 86. Nicholas Wade & Eric Schmitt, Bush’s Authorization for Troops to Use Tear Gas is Criticized, 
INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Apr. 3, 2003, at 3. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Paul Richter, After the War: Treaty Complicates Crowd Control, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2003, at 
A8. 
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Some commentators have pointed out that the use of RCAs on the bat-
tlefield creates a slippery slope.  It could provoke retaliation with more 
toxic weapons.  Furthermore, use of RCAs on the battlefield could also 
result in the use of “chemicals on intermingled combatants and civilians in 
a war zone, for example, [or] could lead to or become the excuse for unre-
stricted employment in urban warfare.”89  Elisa Harris, of the Center for 
International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, drew 
parallels between the United States’ decision to use RCAs in combat to 
previous uses of chemicals in combat.90  “In four major uses of chemical 
weapons in the past—by combatants in World War I, by the Italians in 
Ethiopia, by the Egyptians in Yemen, and the Iran-Iraq war—deployment 
was preceded by non-lethal agents.”91   
The point at which a non-lethal weapon becomes lethal is a matter of 
degree.  This issue presents several problems.  At what percentage does a 
non-lethal gas become a lethal agent (thirty to forty percent fatality rate)?  
At what point does a gas inflict no fewer casualties than firing lethal shots 
to disperse a crowd? 
The CWC attempts to overcome this slippery slope by requiring the 
following: (1) RCAs must not be listed as restricted chemicals,92 (2) RCAs 
must be registered with the OPCW,93 and (3) RCAs cannot be used as a 
method of warfare.94  There is general agreement that a prohibited method 
of warfare is defined as non-lethal chemicals being used in conjunction 
with lethal force.95 
C. Improper Use of White Phosphorus 
1. Customary International Law 
[N]ot everything automatically becomes permissible between hos-
tile parties once war has regrettably begun.  As a means of limiting 
the devastating consequences of war as much as possible, espe-
cially for civilians, the international community has created inter-
national humanitarian law.  [R]espect for that law must be binding 
on all peoples.96 
  
 89. Harper, supra note 75, at 152 (emphasis added). 
 90. Wade & Schmitt, supra note 86. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 46, art. II, § 7. 
 93. Id. art. III, § 1(e). 
 94. Id. art. I, § 5. 
 95. Harper, supra note 75, at 134, 158. 
 96. Stacey Meichtry, Pope Speaks Out Against Sophisticated Weapons of War, RELIGION NEWS 
SERVICE, Dec. 13, 2005. 
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Customary international law “results from a general and consistent 
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”97  In 
order for a state practice to become customary international law, states 
must follow the practice out of a sense of legal obligation or opinio juris.98  
“Explicit evidence of a sense of legal obligation” may come from official 
statements.99  Moreover, “in determining whether a rule has become inter-
national law, substantial weight is accorded to . . . the opinions of interna-
tional tribunals and the writings of scholars.”100  Consequently, customary 
international law is binding upon all states even in the absence of a particu-
lar state’s consent.101  However, it may be modified within a state by sub-
sequent legislation or a treaty.102 
Section 701 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States declares that: 
A state is obligated to respect human rights subject to its jurisdic-
tion: (a) that it has undertaken to respect by international agree-
ment; (b) that states generally are bound to respect as a matter of 
customary international law; and (c) that it is required to respect 
under general principles of law common to the major legal systems 
of the world.103 
The following sections analyze the prohibition of improper use of white 
phosphorus under (1) customary international law as established by state 
practice of sovereign nations, and (2) prohibition of the white phosphorus 
recognized under the CWC. 
2. State Practice: Official Statements 
There is evidence of state practice that many nations (including major 
nations) and the United Nations view the anti-personnel use of white phos-
phorus as prohibited under international law.  The official British policy is 
not to use it as an anti-personnel weapon.104  Although the Israelis were 
reported to have used white phosphorus as an anti-personnel weapon, the 
official position of Israeli officers was that they do not use white phospho-
  
 97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 102(2) (1987). 
 98. Id. § 102 cmt. c. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. § 103(2)(a), (c). 
 101. See id. § 102 cmts. d, k. 
 102. Id. § 115. 
 103. Id. § 701. 
 104. Reynolds, supra note 7. 
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rus in that way.105  Likewise, in response to allegations of illegal white 
phosphorus use in Iraq, the Russian Duma (Senate) issued a statement con-
demning the use of phosphorus bombs under any circumstances and stated 
that such bombs are banned by international treaties even “under cover of 
noble aims of the fight against terrorism.”106  In response to questions on 
whether the Italian government would condemn America’s use of white 
phosphorus in Iraq, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi said, “[i]f 
white phosphorus was used, condemnation is absolutely inevitable.”107  
Other countries have also stated publicly that white phosphorus is only 
used for the purpose of screening and/or illumination and not as an anti-
personnel weapon.108  Scholars have also raised questions as to white phos-
phorus’s illegality as an anti-personnel weapon.109 
  
 105. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CIVILIAN PAWNS: LAWS OF WAR VIOLATIONS AND THE USE OF 
WEAPONS ON THE ISRAEL-LEBANON BORDER (1996), available at http://hrw.org/reports/1996/ Is-
rael.htm [hereinafter CIVILIAN PAWNS]. 
 106. Russian Parliament Condemns U.S. Use of Phosphorus Bombs in Iraq, AFX NEWS, Nov. 24, 
2005 [hereinafter Russian Parliament Condemns].  See also Russian Duma Urges Probe into Iraqi 
Human Rights, Criticizes U.S., RIA NOVOSTI, Nov. 24, 2005.  Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez 
called the U.S.’s use of white phosphorus in Iraq a violation of international law.  Venezuelan Leaders’ 
Statements on US 26 Nov-2 Dec 05, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Dec. 3, 2005.  Cuba’s President Fidel 
Castro said, “White phosphorus in Fallujah—that is a weapon prohibited among international weap-
ons.”  Castro Denies CIA Parkinson’s Diagnosis, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Nov. 18, 2005. 
 107. Berlusconi Pledges to Stay as P.M. for Next Five Years, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 23, 
2005 (emphasis added). 
 108. Italian Army Chief of Staff Filberto Cecchi said, “[white phosphorus] are munitions which are 
used for specific purposes, to create smoke shields or to illuminate a battlefield.”  Weekly Says Army 
Has Purchased White Phosphorus Munitions, ANSA ENG. MEDIA SERVICE, Nov. 24, 2005.  British 
Defense Secretary John Reid told The Guardian that the British Military uses white phosphorus to 
provide smokescreen cover on operations.  When asked about the American use he replied that “the 
Americans have to answer the questions which are put to them on this issue . . . . I can only answer for 
the British.”  Michael White & Richard Norton-Taylor, Tougher Phosphorus Rules Urged After U.S. 
Use in Falluja Siege, THE GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 17, 2005, at 4.  Danish Prime Minister Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen said that the “United States and other countries active in Iraq must respect interna-
tional conventions ruling how to wage war . . . . The premier said he had not recently discussed the 
issue of white phosphorus or allegations of torture with [United States] President George W. Bush, but 
‘he has no doubts about my views.’”  Denmark “Not Ready to Set Date for Leaving Iraq,” DEUTSCHE 
PRESS-AGENTUR, Nov. 22, 2005. 
 109. Paul Rodgers of the University of Bradford Department of Peace Studies said “[white phospho-
rus] probably would fall into the category of [a] chemical weapon if used directly against people.”  U.S. 
Denies Chemical Attack on Iraq, DAILY POST (Liverpool, U.K.), Nov. 16, 2005, at 5.  Professor Nor-
man Dombey of Sussex University said that  
[t]he use of white phosphorus shells by coalition infantry at Fallujah on residential areas is 
banned by the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention.  That is arguable, but unlikely to be 
accepted by the British government. 
What is beyond doubt however, is that the use of [white phosphorus] shells in civilian 
areas is banned by Protocol III on the use of incendiary weapons of the 1980 Geneva con-
vention on conventional weapons. 
Phosphorus Banned Under 1980 Treaty, Says Physics Professor, IRNA (Tehran), Nov. 22, 2005, 
available at http://dtirp.dtra.mil/tic/WTR/wtr_22nov05.pdf.  Marie Chevrier, Associate Professor of 
Political Economics at the University of Texas–Dallas, told WBEZ-FM radio that the use of white 
phosphorus as a weapon is banned under the Chemical Weapons Convention because it turns into a 
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There is also evidence of state practice that white phosphorus use is 
prohibited against civilians.  In the Bosnian War, Serbian forces shelled a 
village, and a white phosphorus shell hit a house, burning one its occu-
pants.110  A spokesman for the United Nations called the action a violation 
of the laws of war.111  Bosnian Ambassador to the UN, Muhamed Sacirbey, 
called on the UN Security Council for assistance in ending civilian suffer-
ing and called the use of phosphorus bombs banned under the Geneva 
Convention.112  He described the Serbs’ use of white phosphorus in the 
following way: 
These weapons are being used against the population of Sarajevo 
without punishment or response.  Once again, Bosnian civilians 
are paying the heaviest price.  According to UN logic, which justi-
fies the failure to act by the fact that the sides are equal in strength, 
the Nazi murders of innocent civilians were really nobody’s busi-
ness, because the allies more than matched the Nazis in strength.113 
Similarly, Human Rights Watch (HRW) investigated reports describing the 
Israeli Defense Forces shelling of Lebanese homes with white phosphorus 
in 1996.  Although there was only circumstantial evidence, HRW stated 
that such violations would be in violation of the Law of Land Warfare.114 
There is also indication and evidence of state practice that the United 
States views the anti-personnel use of white phosphorus as a violation of 
the laws of war.  The last official statement by the Department of Defense 
was that white phosphorus was only used for screening, marking, and illu-
mination.  The U.S. Army Training Battle Book states that anti-personnel 
use of white phosphorus is prohibited by the laws of war.115  In World War 
  
mist that burns what it touches, and described the irritating and caustic effect it has on mucus mem-
branes.  White Phosphorus Controversy (WBEZ-FM radio broadcast Nov. 18, 2005). 
 110. United Nations spokesman Alexander Ivanko commented on the use of white phosphorus artil-
lery shells in the town of Maglaj: “This attack proves just how much respect the Bosnian Serbs have for 
the laws of the international community from which they seek recognition and legitimacy.”  John 
Pomfret, U.N. Gives Evidence of Serb Air Attack on Bosnian Enclave; Bombing Would Violate NATO 
‘No-Fly Zone’, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 1995.  United Nations spokesman Lt. Col. Gary Coward said 
that the use of white phosphorus by the Serbs was banned under the Geneva Convention because it 
causes “severe burns.”  Fighting Worsens Inside Sarajevo, SUN-SENTINEL (Fla.), May 25, 1995, at 
14A.  See also Sean Maguire, Serbs Launch Phosphorus Attack in Bosnia, REUTERS, Apr. 29, 1995. 
 111. Pomfret, supra note 110. 
 112. Bosnian Ambassador Calls on U.N. to Protect Civilians in Bosnia, BBC, May 25, 1995. 
 113. Id. 
 114. CIVILIAN PAWNS, supra note 105.  In response to allegations that Israel used white phosphorus 
in southern Lebanon in July 2006, Human Rights Watch Emergencies Director Peter Bouckaert told the 
Sydney Morning Herald: “Phosphorus shells do have a legitimate use in illuminating the battlefield at 
night.  The offensive use of phosphorus would be a violation of international conventions.”  Israel 
Using Chemical Weapons: Doctors, SYDNEY MORNING HARALD, July 27, 2006. 
 115. U.S. ARMY COMMAND & GEN. STAFF COLL., BATTLE BOOK / ST 100-3, at ch. 5, § 3, subsec. 5-
11(b)(4) (1999), available at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/docs/st100-3/c5/5sect3.htm. 
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II, a declassified memo instructed military leaders to refrain from mention-
ing the anti-personnel use of white phosphorus to the media because it 
caused unnecessary suffering and violated the laws of war.116  In response 
to Serbian shelling of Sarajevo in 1995, Republican Senate Majority 
Leader Robert Dole issued the following Congressional Press Release: “It 
is about time that the UN allowed NATO to take action to respond to the 
dramatically deteriorating situation in Sarajevo.  Just yesterday, the citi-
zens of Sarajevo were attacked with phosphorous [sic] shells—which are 
banned by the Geneva Convention.”117 
More recently, Gen. James “Spyder” Marks, former commander of in-
telligence for U.S. forces in Iraq, told CNN that white phosphorus should 
not be used against troops in the open.118  Similarly, in the wake of allega-
tions that U.S. forces used white phosphorus as a weapon in Fallujah in 
2005, Lt. Gen. Walter Buchanan III, commander for U.S. Central Com-
mand’s Air Forces, told reporters that “white phosphorus is purely used as 
a marking round, not a weapon.”119 
According to Jon Holdaway, American Fire Direction Artillery Offi-
cers that use white phosphorus when there are other means available would 
violate the principle of unnecessary suffering.120  On the other hand, if 
there were no other means available to accomplish the particular military 
objective, then the use would be legal as the suffering was necessary.  This 
conclusion assumes that the use of white phosphorus in such a context does 
not violate a treaty agreement.121 
  
 116. Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Combined Field Press Censorship Group, 
“Terror” Bombing of German Cities, Feb. 18, 1945, http://www.fpp.co.uk/History/General/Cen-
sored0245.html. 
 117. Bob Dole, Senate Majority Leader, Bosnia Airstrike, CONG. PRESS RELEASES, May 25, 1995 
(emphasis added). 
 118. Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees: Crisis in the Middle East (CNN television broadcast July 24, 
2006), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0607/24/acd.02.html. 
 119. Mortenson, supra note 3 (emphasis added). 
 120. Jon D. Holdaway, The Law of War and File Support: A Primer for Fire Supporters, FIELD 
ARTILLERY J., May 2001, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IAU/is_3_6/ 
ai_76610404. 
 121. “Military necessity is not a defense for acts expressly prohibited by [treaty].”  INT’L & 
OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CTR. AND SCH., OPERATIONAL LAW 
HANDBOOK 12 (2006) [hereinafter OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK], available at http://www.fas.org/ 
irp/doddir/army/law0806.pdf. 
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III.  WHITE PHOSPHORUS AND THE CWC 
A. Screening and Illumination, or Flush Out and Kill? 
On the roof, embers of white phosphorus glowed in the dark, from 
the flares fired by the advancing forces that snaked down from the 
sky like the tentacles of an octopus.  The air was filled with acrid 
chemical smoke.122 
International law requires that a “treaty be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context and in light of its object and purpose.”123  In determining 
whether American white phosphorus attacks constituted a violation of 
CWC Article 2(9)(C), 22 U.S.C. § 6711, we must determine whether these 
attacks were dependent and/or connected to the chemical’s toxic properties 
for the purpose of flushing the enemy out of enclosed spaces so they could 
then be killed with conventional weapons. 
In reaction to allegations of illegal white phosphorus use in Iraq by 
U.S. forces, some have insisted that white phosphorus is not a banned 
chemical under the CWC.124  David Fidler suggests that white phosphorus 
might be considered an improper use of an RCA because it was seemingly 
used to generate “smoke [to] produce[] . . . temporary [disabling] effects” 
as a method of warfare.125  More specifically, these effects would drive 
insurgents out of entrenched positions where they could then be attacked 
by high explosives.126 
Fidler raises three issues with this theory.  First, he contends that the 
“Shake & Bake” tactics seemed to be open air detonations and not within 
  
 122. Anne Barnard, Advancing Forces Meet an Eerie Stillness, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 9, 2004, at 
A20. 
 123. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), done on May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
(1980), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf. 
 124. All Things Considered: Pentagon Defends Use of Toxic Agent in Iraq, (Nat’l Pub. Radio broad-
cast Nov. 18, 2005), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5019073 
[hereinafter Pentagon Defends]. 
 125. David Fidler, The Use of White Phosphorus Munitions by U.S. Military Forces in Iraq, ASIL 
INSIGHTS, Dec. 6, 2005, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/12/insights051206.html. 
 126. Id. 
While use of white phosphorous [sic] might be legal as an illuminator or smoke screen, its 
legality may shift when used in the confines of a cave, bunker, or foxhole, as appears to 
have been the case in Fallujah.  Indeed, white phosphorus not only has the potential of caus-
ing superfluous injuries and unnecessary suffering through painful chemical burns, but also 
has the potential of asphyxiating or suffocating the occupants of an enclosed space on ac-
count of the burst of yellow flames and thick smoke produced upon its contact with oxygen, 
as its chemical reaction continues until the material is consumed or the oxygen is depleted 
entirely. 
Fry, supra note 41, at 458. 
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enclosed spaces.127  Second, he states that white phosphorus has not been 
considered to fall within the “ambit of the CWC’s rules on RCAs.”128 
Third, he argues that the primary difficulty with “the RCA argument is that 
the permitted uses of white phosphorus munitions as marking, illuminat-
ing, or screening and (in certain circumstances) incendiary weapons also 
produce smoke that contains toxic substances that might be temporarily 
irritating or disabling.”129  Thus, the primary question is whether white 
phosphorus’s toxic properties were purposely used to flush out and kill. 
Despite these contentions and observations, credible evidence strongly 
suggests that the detonations have purposely taken place within enclosed 
spaces such as spider holes,130 entrenched lines,131 covered positions,132 
bunkers,133 and the insides of buildings.134  Moreover, Spokesmen Lieuten-
ant Colonels Venable and Boylan have both publicly recognized the utility 
of phosphorus smoke in driving the enemy from positions.135 
In addition, it is patently false that the United States has never consid-
ered white phosphorus an RCA, which would fall within the ambit of the 
CWC.  In a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the le-
gal status of white phosphorus under the CWC was briefly discussed: 
SEN. NUNN: Turning to riot control agents, have you talked about 
those yet . . . . 
. . . 
SEN. NUNN: So-called RCAs, riot control agents.  General, ac-
cording to your testimony the administration interprets the prohibi-
tion of using riot control agents as a method of warfare, to include 
targeting combatants.  During Vietnam, white phosphorus rounds 
were commonly used by artillery, armor, and aviation units to di-
rect fire and register artillery and naval gun fire.  Are white phos-
phorus rounds still in use today, and if so, would the use of these 
rounds in a combat scenario be prohibited? 
[DEPUTY SEC’Y OF DEFENSE] DEUTCH: The Schedule C, 
sir—if I may answer the question—Schedule C contains chemicals 
  
 127. Fidler, supra note 125. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Cobb, supra note 16. 
 131. Emery, supra note 10. 
 132. White Phosphorus, supra note 65. 
 133. Newsnight: U.S. Military Admits Use of White Phosphorus Weapons in Iraq (BBC television 
broadcast Nov. 15, 2005). 
 134. Catagnus et. al, supra note 18. 
 135. Emery, supra note 10; White Phosphorus, supra note 65. 
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such as phosphorus, such as hydrogen cyanide, which have been 
previously used for—conceived of for chemical agent use, but 
have other applications, and they are not banned by the treaty. 
SEN. NUNN: They are not[?] 
[DEPUTY SEC’Y OF DEFENSE] DEUTCH: They are not.136 
It is unclear what the Deputy Secretary of Defense meant by “Schedule 
C.”  There is no Schedule C of Chemicals in the CWC.  Neither the current 
CWC annex of schedules nor the 1993 CWC Handbook makes any refer-
ence to a Schedule C list of chemicals.137  However, hydrogen cyanide is 
on Schedule 3.  Interestingly, in defense of white phosphorus as a dual use 
agent, Deutch makes an intriguing comparison to hydrogen cyanide.  In the 
Zyklon B case, the tribunal found that Tesch was responsible for purposely 
killing allied nationals with a common chemical in enclosed spaces.  Logi-
cally, the U.S. Defense Department’s comparison of white phosphorus 
with hydrogen cyanide extends the Zyklon B principle (purposeful toxicity 
within enclosed spaces to cause death) to the proper and improper uses of 
white phosphorus. 
Fundamentally, the U.S. Defense Department’s comments on both tox-
ic chemicals seem to express the principle that the legality of a chemical 
agent is determined by the purpose for which the chemical is used.  More 
importantly is the Defense Department’s acknowledgment of white phos-
phorus being restricted by the Chemical Weapons Convention and that the 
United States would be in compliance if it continued to use it for proper 
purposes such as marking and screening (purposes not dependent upon or 
connected to white phosphorus’s toxicity).  This American position is con-
sistent with the current OPCW opinion on the prohibited uses of white 
phosphorus.  Peter Kaiser, spokesman for the OPCW, explained the legal 
status to the BBC in response to being asked if white phosphorus was 
banned: 
No it is not forbidden by the CWC if it is used within the con-
text of a military application which does not tend to require or does 
not intend to use the toxic properties of white phosphorus.  White 
phosphorus is normally used to produce smoke, to camouflage 
movement. 
  
 136. Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee Subject: Chemical Weapons Convention, 
FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 11, 1994 [hereinafter CWC Hearing] (emphasis added). 
 137. See generally BARRY KELLMAN ET AL., MANUAL FOR NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (1993). 
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If that is the purpose for which the white phosphorus is used, 
then that is considered under the Convention legitimate use.  If on 
the other hand, the toxic properties of white phosphorus, the caus-
tic properties, are specifically intended to be used as a weapon, 
that of course is prohibited, because the way the Convention is 
structured or the way it is in fact applied, any chemicals used 
against humans or animals that cause harm or death through the 
toxic properties of the chemical are considered chemical weap-
ons.138 
Phosphorus is specifically listed within the inspection schedule as a 
PSF (phosphorus, sulfur, fluorine) UDOC.139  Furthermore, like other in-
spection chemicals, UDOCs can be used to produce, or improperly used 
themselves to become, illicit chemical weapons.  UDOCs (sulfur in the 
Peloponnesian War, chlorine gas in WWI) have been historically used as 
chemical weapons to disrupt enemy positions.  The next section addresses 
Fidler’s third and primary contention by examining the history of white 
phosphorus as a beneficial toxic chemical in combat. 
B. White Phosphorus as a Chemical Agent 
1. Shake & Bake: Toxicity as a Necessary Ingredient 
In 1943, reports from the front in World War II praised the versatility 
of the 4.2 WP rifled mortar.140  The U.S. Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) 
developed white phosphorus munitions.141  It was originally designed to 
cloak troops with smoke screens but it had “become one of the great anti-
personnel weapons of the war.”142  Army commanders considered white 
phosphorus to be “versatile” and its use paid dividends.143  It was used to 
produce smoke screens, inflict burns, set fires, unnerve enemy troops, sup-
port infantry attacks, shield flame-thrower operations, and to flush out 
troops from fortified positions.  “For these reasons the CWS purchased two 
hundred million pounds of white phosphorus from 1942–1945, far more 
than any other smoke agent during the war.”144 
  
 138. Reynolds, supra note 7 (emphasis added). 
 139. Id. 
 140. White Fire, TIME, Nov. 29, 1943, at 68. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. BROOKS E. KLEBER & DALE BIRDSELL, THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE: CHEMICALS IN 
COMBAT 509 (2003). 
 144. Id. 
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The three anti-personnel uses (psychological effect, inflicting burns, 
and flushing out) are important for this analysis because they depend on 
the toxicity of white phosphorus.  The psychological effect is described as 
“tremendous,” instilling “fear,” and hard on enemy morale.145  For inflict-
ing burns, white phosphorus was described as a “rain of fire,” “particularly 
painful,” “slow to heal,” “sticks to clothing and cannot be brushed off,” 
“burns to the bone,” and “wounded enemy soldiers just as readily as rifle 
bullets and shell fragments.”146  More importantly, World War II seems to 
be the first time that the U.S. military discovered that they could use the 
toxicity of white phosphorus to flush out the enemy from fortified posi-
tions.  Consider these four examples: 
“The Germans are very allergic to [white phosphorus].  We would 
root them out of their foxholes with well-placed rounds of phos-
phorus and when we had them above ground we plastered them 
with HE [high explosive].  We killed large numbers of them in that 
way and they sure dreaded the mortars. . . . Letters taken from 
prisoners have shown that the Germans fear [white phosphorus] . . 
. .”147 
Artillery and chemical mortar companies hurled shells [white 
phosphorus] to set fire to enemy held buildings and cane fields, to 
drive the enemy soldiers from fortified positions, to wound and 
unnerve enemy troops, to support infantry attacks, and to shield 
flame-thrower operations.148 
White Phosphorus is another favorite.  It burns, even under water 
and the fumes are toxic.  It is not fun to sit in a fighting hole while 
everything burns down around you [and you] have to breath toxic 
fumes.  While the fumes do not kill someone who breathes them, 
like nerve gas, they are not exactly harmless either.  White Phos-
phorus or WP can also be used to mark a target for air strikes be-
cause it generates a lot of smoke and is visible to a fast moving at-
tack fighter.149 
  
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. White Fire, supra note 140 (second alteration in original). 
 148. LEO BROPHY ET AL., THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE: FROM LABORATORY TO FIELD 198 
(1959). 
 149. William S. Frisbee, Jr., Mortars, http://www.military-sf.com/mortars.htm.  “White phosphorus 
smoke—it is toxic.”  Lester W. Grau & Jacob W. Kipp, Urban Combat: Confronting the Specter, 
MILITARY REV., July–Aug. 1999, available at http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/documents/urban-
combat/urbancombat.htm. 
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. . . Despite the weight and ammunition problem, it is a magnifi-
cent and extraordinarily effective weapon.  The mortar is most ef-
fective with white phosphorus and HE.  The Germans are very al-
lergic to white phosphorus anyway and we would root them out of 
their holes with well-placed rounds of phosphorus and, when we 
had them above ground, we plastered them with HE.  We killed 
large numbers of them that way, and they sure dreaded the mor-
tars.150 
The British in the Falkland War described a similar tactic.  Col. Tim 
Collins, a former British Special Air Service officer, described “Shake & 
Bake”: “Shake and Bake is a recognized tactic and was used extensively in 
the Falklands.  If you want to winkle the enemy out of buildings there is no 
better way than using white phosphorus.”151 
In Colonel Collins’s autobiography Rules of Engagement, he describes 
training the Royal Irish Regiment for a planned operation in Basra Iraq 
called Operation Fury.  He called white phosphorus the “star of the show”: 
The star of the show was the new grenade which had only been on 
issue since the previous summer.  It absolutely trashed the inside 
of the room it was put into.  I directed the men to use them where 
possible with white phosphorus, as the noxious smoke and heat had 
the effect of drawing out enemy from cover, while the fragmenta-
tion grenade would shred them.152 
Interestingly, these examples point that the driving out of troops from 
foxholes, entrenched positions, and buildings is connected to the “allergic 
effect,” “toxic fumes,” and “noxious/choking smoke” caused by white 
phosphorus.  These attributes substantially differentiate white phosphorus 
from other chemicals or explosives that cause unintended exposure to toxic 
fumes.  The noxious properties of white phosphorus smoke (phosphorus 




 150. DAVID W. MEYERSON & BOB LADSON, WORLD WAR II HISTORY OF THE SECOND CHEMICAL 
MORTAR BATTALION, available at http://www.4point2.org/hist-2w.htm (emphasis added) (last visited 
Dec. 5, 2007). 
 151. Sean Rayment, Tim Collins Trained Troops to Fight with White Phosphorus, SUNDAY TELE-
GRAPH (London), Nov. 20, 2005, at 13.  Combinations of white phosphorus and explosive grenades are 
also known as a “dolly mixture.”  See Thomas Harding, Chemical Grenade Used on Rebels, U.S. 
Admits, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 16, 2005, at 16. 
 152. Rayment, supra note 151.  “[W]hite phosphorus . . . generate[s] a choking smokescreen and 
set[s] fire to almost anything they hit.”  George C. Wilson, Visible Violence, NAT’L J., Mar. 22, 2003. 
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2. Israeli and Serbian Use of White Phosphorus: An Irritant in a  
Civilian Population 
In Lebanon, in October 1993, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) launched 
a week long attack in retaliation for a rocket attack against Israeli civilians 
by Hamas.153  The operation was named Operation Accountability.  The 
IDF reportedly used phosphorus shells against military and civilian targets.  
A chief feature of the IDF’s policy was a depopulating of the south which 
led to the dislocation of over 300,000 people.154  Human Rights Watch 
consulted U.S. military experts and noted an unusual incidence of incendi-
ary and illumination rounds.  According to two experts from the U.S. Na-
tional Ground Intelligence Center: “One possible explanation for this, in 
their view, was that such rounds lessen civilian casualties, and their use 
made good sense in any attempt to compel people to leave their homes.”155  
This tactic seemed consistent with the IDF leader’s stated objective to fo-
ment a refugee exodus from villages in southern Lebanon to Beirut.156 
Similarly, UN Reports out of Sarajevo in 1995 during the Serbian 
siege described some areas of the city as being filled with white smoke 
coming from white phosphorus grenades meant to “intimidate civilians.”157  
The New York Times reported that the smoke from the white phosphorus 
grenades was “banned under the Geneva [C]onvention on the use of 
chemical weapons.”158  The Jerusalem Post said that the Geneva Conven-
tion specifically bans the use of white phosphorus and that its use should 
be included as one of Yugoslavia’s war crimes.159   
3. Russian Use of White Phosphorus: A Toxic Gas in Urban Fighting 
On New Year’s Eve in 1994, Russian forces first attempted to seize the 
rebel Chechen city of Grozny.  Lessons learned from the siege describe 
white phosphorus, tear gas, tranquilizers, and other agents as very useful.  
White Phosphorus as a smoke screen was essential for movement in the 
city.  Moreover, the Russians also indicated a side benefit of white phos-
phorus.  It was also useful as a toxic smoke that “readily penetrated protec-
  
 153. CIVILIAN PAWNS, supra note 105. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Roger Cohen, NATO May Be Called on to Silence Guns in Sarajevo, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 
1995, at 14. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Editorial, The Saigon Feeling, JERUSALEM POST, May 25, 1995, at 6. 
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tive mask filters.”160  In the siege, “every fourth or fifth artillery round was 
smoke or white phosphorus.”  The article points out that the use of white 
phosphorus is not in violation of any convention.161   
However, during the siege the president of Chechnya, Dzhokhar Du-
dayev, called for the United States to cut off aid to Russia and said that the 
Russians were “deliberately attacking the civilian population in Chechnya, 
using multiple rocket launchers, napalm, cluster bombs and phosphorus 
bombs.”162  According to the Chechens, the Russians were using banned 
ammunition.163  One report out of Chechnya indicated that 200 people were 
admitted to a hospital for chemical poisoning in the village of Avturu.164  
“Eyewitnesses testified that five . . . [villagers] . . . developed sores and 
rash which resemble the after-effects of such chemical substances as chlo-
rine or phosphorus.”165 
4. Summary of White Phosphorus as a Chemical Agent 
The use of white phosphorus as a chemical agent by the United States 
during World War II and the British during the Falkland conflict demon-
strates a specific method of warfare that is dependent on and/or connected 
to the chemical’s toxic properties.  White phosphorus was employed both 
as a profound wounding mechanism and an irritant used in conjunction 
with conventional weapons.  The use by the Israelis illustrates the utility of 
white phosphorus’s toxic effects in driving civilians out of urban areas and 
minimizing the loss of innocent lives.  The Serbs used white phosphorus 
smoke to intimidate civilians.  Moreover, the Russians’ use of white phos-
phorus in the siege on Grozny found value in white phosphorus as a toxic 
gas that can penetrate protective masks in urban fighting.  These examples 
illustrate military applications in which white phosphorus’s toxicity was 
purposefully utilized. 
  
 160. Lester W. Grau, Changing Russian Urban Tactics: The Aftermath of the Battle for Grozny, INSS 
STRATEGIC FORUM (No. 38), July 1995, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/ 
report/1995/grozny.htm. 
 161. Id. (this siege occurred prior to Russian ratification of the CWC).  
 162. President Dudayev told the Washington Post: “The whole city is destroyed—the hospitals, the 
buildings, the schools.”  He also said that “[i]f we start a guerrilla war, we will start it inside Russia.”  
His foreign minister, Shamsettin Yusef, added, “We will fight in Moscow if they don’t stop the war.”  
Editorial, Chechnya’s Resolve, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1995, at A15. 
 163. The official Russian response to the allegations was that “[o]nly positions of the illegally formed 
armed groupings come under federal artillery and air attacks.”  Chechnya: Use of Cluster Bombs and 
Phosphorus Denied by Federal Troops Command, BBC, May 19, 1995. 
 164. Chechen Villagers Admitted to Hospital Suffering from Chemical Poisoning, BBC, Aug. 12, 
1995. 
 165. Id. 
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These particular uses of white phosphorus illustrate what U.S. Deputy 
Department of Defense Secretary Deutch meant by “conceived of for 
chemical agent use” and what OPCW spokesman Peter Kaiser meant in 
saying that the “toxic properties of white phosphorus, the caustic proper-
ties, are specifically intended to be used as a weapon.”166  Moreover, these 
uses of white phosphorus are entirely consistent with historical uses of 
other chemical weapons used in dislodging enemy troops (i.e., sulfur, chlo-
rine gas) and uses of RCAs as prohibited methods of warfare (to flush out 
and kill).  Whereas common explosives might cause unintended exposure 
to toxic chemicals, the particular tactic of “Shake & Bake” is a deliberate 
use of white phosphorus’s toxic properties as a prohibited method of war-
fare.  
C. American Phosphorus Attacks in Iraq: Evidence of a Consistent Pattern 
of Gross Violations 
In mid-November 2005, Lt. Gen. Walter Buchanan III, commander for 
U.S. Central Command Air Forces told the Wall Street Journal that “white 
phosphorus is purely used as a marking round, not a weapon.”167  Simi-
larly, on November 29, 2005, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Peter Pace told reporters that “it [was] well within the law of war to use 
[white phosphorus] for [smokescreens] and [illumination].”168  Likewise, 
according to Teledyne Technologies Inc., the businessmen that produce 
white phosphorus projectiles for the military, “[w]hite phosphorus is a 
chemical used to fill munitions and projectiles for signaling, screening and 
incendiary purposes.”169  Despite these official statements by two top-
ranking generals and the firm that supplies the chemical, there have been 
several instances of anti-personnel use of white phosphorus in Iraq by U.S. 
forces that go beyond “purely” conventional purposes.   
For example, in Infantry Magazine, Staff Sgt. Jason E. Levy described 
troops fleeing from an observation post that were hit with white phospho-
rus fires in Irbil, Iraq in 2003.170  In Infantry Magazine, Captain Budihas 
noted the benefit of using illumination projectiles to “suppress enemy per-
sonnel” in Kirkuk, Iraq in 2004.171  In an April 2004 Fallujah report, the 
North County Times described Cpl. Nicholas Bogert employing the tactic 
  
 166. Reynolds, supra note 7. 
 167. Mortenson, supra note 3 (emphasis added). 
 168. Crawly, supra note 14. 
 169. Teledyne Awarded $10 Million Pine Bluff Arsenal Subcontract, BUS. WIRE, Oct. 26, 2005, 
(emphasis added). 
 170. Jason E. Levy, TTPs for the 60mm Mortar Section, INFANTRY MAG., May 1, 2004, at 43. 
 171. Christopher L. Budihas, So You’re Going to Iraq, INFANTRY MAG., Sept. 1, 2004, at 23. 
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of “Shake & Bake” where white phosphorus and HE (high explosives) 
were fired into buildings of suspected insurgents.172  In November 2004, in 
Field Artillery Magazine, Capt. James T. Cobb pointed out that they saved 
white phosphorus for lethal missions and described the tactic of “Shake & 
Bake” as firing white phosphorus into trenches and spider holes of sus-
pected insurgents.173  In the Marine Corps Gazette, Sgt. Earl Catagnus re-
ported on the use of an improvised phosphorus bomb which was used to 
clear out buildings of suspected insurgents in the November battle for Fal-
lujah.174  Moreover, mid-level Pentagon Spokesmen Major Vican, Lieuten-
ant Colonels Boylan and Venable, and Colonel Lapan have stated that U.S. 
forces have used white phosphorus as an anti-personnel weapon in Iraq.  
Likewise, journalists from the San Francisco Chronicle, Washington Post, 
Boston Globe, CNN, ABC News, North-County Times, and the Sunday 
Telegraph (UK) also reported on American white phosphorus anti-
personnel use.175  These instances clearly describe the use of white phos-
phorus as an anti-personnel weapon against enemy combatants, and not as 
General Pace and Lieutenant General Buchanan III contend, for the pur-
pose of illumination or smokescreens. 
D. Law of War Violation: The Soldier’s Dilemma  
The use of white phosphorus as an offensive weapon may be a viola-
tion of the Law of Land Warfare in certain situations.  It is well established 
that white phosphorus causes painful chemical burns and that these burns 
are slow to heal and may cause system toxicity or death if not treated.176  
  
 172. Darrin Mortenson, Violence Subsides for Marines in Fallujah, N. COUNTY TIMES (Escondido, 
Cal.), Apr. 10, 2004, available at http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2004/04/11/military/iraq/19_30_ 
504_10_04.txt. 
 173. Cobb et al., supra note 16, at 26. 
 174. Catagnus et al., supra note 18, at 88. 
 175. The San Francisco Chronicle reported that artillery guns had fired white phosphorus and insur-
gents reported “being attacked with a substance that melted their skin, a reaction consistent with white 
phosphorous [sic] burns.”  Matthew B. Stannard, U.S. Drives into Heart of Fallujah, S.F. CHRON., 
Nov. 10, 2004, at A1.  Kamal Hadeethi, a physician at a regional hospital told the chronicle that “[t]he 
corpses of the mujahedeen which we received were burned, and some corpses were melted.”  Id.  
“Insurgents reported being attacked with a substance that melted their skin.”  Jackie Spinner, U.S. 
Forces Battle into Heart of Fallujah, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2004, at A1.  Iraqi journalist Uthman 
Mohammed al-Qaisi told Boston Globe correspondents: “At Firdous, wounded insurgents screamed 
from bullet wounds or burns from phosphorus.  ‘Some of them were bleeding from their noses, eyes, 
and ears.’”  Sa’ad al-Izzi, Armed with Pen, Pad on Front Line Iraqi Journalists Find Little Refuge in 
No Man’s Land, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 14, 2004, at A10.  “In this field they find unexploded white 
phosphorus mortars designed to break apart in a rain of caustic fire.  The soldiers wrap them with 
plastic explosives and take cover when they’re detonated.”  CNN News Night with Aaron Brown (CNN 
television broadcast Nov. 17, 2004).  “In the early morning hours before dawn, a devastating fireworks 
display of air power.  The skies lit up with phosphorus shells designed to burn through insurgent bun-
kers.”  Good Morning America (ABC television broadcast Nov. 9, 2004). 
 176. Thomas E. Bowen, Sudden Death After Phosphorus Burns, 174 ANN. SURG. 779, 779 (1971). 
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However, under the laws of war, anti-personnel use of white phosphorus 
may be legal, provided there was military necessity.177  Could high explo-
sives, thermite, or grenades have been used instead of white phosphorus 
directly on enemy troops?  The answer to the question requires particular-
ized investigations in each instance.  Therefore, the use of white phospho-
rus against open enemy troops may have been justifiable under the laws of 
war given circumstances where necessity was present and the weapon’s 
use was not dependent or connected to the chemical’s toxic properties. 
However, “Shake & Bake,” the use of white phosphorus’s toxic prop-
erties within enclosed areas for the purpose of flushing out enemy troops 
so they can be killed with conventional means, poses a unique law of war 
dilemma.  On the one hand, this tactic may indeed be the only means nec-
essary to accomplish the task of flushing the enemy out from fortified or 
enclosed positions.  Hence, its use is consistent with the principle of mili-
tary necessity.  This defense may have been sufficient prior to the ratifica-
tion of the CWC.  On the other hand, pursuant to the Law of Land Warfare, 
necessity is not a defense for actions prohibited under treaty.178  Since the 
CWC prohibits the use of white phosphorus’s toxic properties as a method 
of warfare, then the “Shake & Bake” technique would be a violation of the 
Law of Land Warfare.  The necessity defense is not available within this 
particular use and context. 
E. The Iraqi Civilian Question 
In the words of the Danish Foreign Minister, “[it] is a highly unpleas-
ant affair if white phosphorus has been used against civilians.  Phosphorus 
cannot be used against civilians.  I am sure the American legal system and 
the American system will get involved if it has been used by American 
soldiers.”179 
On November 16, 2005, the Pentagon Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Public Affairs told reporters that he had no knowledge of any Iraqi civilian 
victims of attacks with American white phosphorus.180  Despite the Penta-
gon’s lack of knowledge, there is indication that white phosphorus has 
caused Iraqi civilian causalities.181  Adam Mynott, a reporter for the BBC 
  
 177. Holdaway, supra note 120. 
 178. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 121, at 12. 
 179. Danish FM Condemns U.S. Use of White Phosphorus in Iraq, BBC MONITORING EUR., Nov. 18, 
2005. 
 180. U.S. Defends Use of White Phosphorus Against Iraq Insurgents, AFX NEWS, Nov. 16, 2005. 
 181. According to Fallujah civilian, Omar Ibrahim Abdullah, while walking to the Euphrates River to 
get away from the heavy fighting he saw dozens of burned bodies that were colored black and red.  He 
said that they were caused by white phosphorus.  Daniszewski & Mazzetti, supra note 9.  “They must 
have been affected by chemicals . . . because I had never seen anything like that before.”  Id. 
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interviewed two Iraqi men badly burned by WP at a U.S. military aid cen-
ter: “One is sitting here in front of me on a stretcher, his face is badly 
burned.  Bits of skin are peeling off, other areas are simply weeping 
wounds, his hands are bandaged.  The other man, his nephew, has lost all 
the skin off his back.”182 
One man told the reporter that there was no reason for the aircraft to 
bomb his home.  “They had no weapons and were just relaxing at 
home.”183  Eleven members of his family died in the air strike and six were 
badly burned “as the phosphorus turned the inside of the house white hot.”  
Lt. Michael Humble, the American medic treating the men, said their “in-
juries required surgery and skin grafting. . . . We can dress the wounds, 
give them some antibiotics and hopefully keep them from getting infected 
but they are already going to be disfigured for the rest of their lives.”184  
This incident occurred in Nasiriya, Iraq.  Coincidently, Nasiriya was 
the province where in March 1994, according to then Iraqi dissidents, the 
“most brutal army commander, Ali Hassan Al Majid” (Chemical Ali) used 
white phosphorus and napalm to set fire to civilian houses.185  Tragically, 
after the American assault in Fallujah in 2004, Mohammed Tareq al Deraji, 
a biologist and director of the Research Centre for the Defence of Human 
Rights, told RAI news that he witnessed “a rain of fire coming down from 
the sky and people catching on fire.”186  More recently, in the June 2007 
counter-insurgent Operation Phantom Thunder in Baquba, Iraq, embedded 
Chief Military Correspondent of the New York Times, Michael Gordon, 
told National Public Radio that “our photographer . . . had seen people who 
are hurt by phosphorus shells.”187  
It is noteworthy to point out that when a Serbian white phosphorus 
round impacted a house, it was condemned by the UN as a clear violation 
of the Law of Land Warfare.  Additionally, while Human Rights Watch 
only had circumstantial evidence of Israelis bombing civilians with white 
phosphorus, it said that such action would be a violation of the Law of 
Land Warfare.  It is unclear why the United Nations and Human Rights 
Watch would condemn such action in previous conflicts and remain silent 
when there were reports of the U.S. military using this chemical and injur-
  
 182. Adam Mynott, Marines Try to Win Over Civilians, BBC NEWS, Apr. 5, 2003, available at 
http://newswww.bbc.net.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2921227.stm. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Charles Richards, Iraq ‘Using Napalm in Marsh Offensive,’ INDEP. (London), Mar. 11, 1994, at 
14.   
 186. Marc Wells, An Interview with Sigfrido Ranucci: Director of The Hidden Massacre, WORLD 
SOCIALIST WEB SITE, Dec. 14, 2005. 
 187. All Things Considered: Baquba Residents Displaced by Insurgents (Nat’l Pub. Radio broadcast 
June 21, 2007). 
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ing Iraqi civilians in Nasariyah, Fallujah, and Baquba.188  However, despite 
these reports of Iraqi civilian casualties, further investigation is needed to 
determine what purpose (smokescreen, illumination, anti-material incendi-
ary, anti-personnel, toxic gas to flush out and kill) the white phosphorus 
was being used for that led to these tragic injuries and deaths. 
F. White Phosphorus as a Toxic Gas to Flush Out and Kill 
According to Harvard biochemistry professor Dr. Matthew Meselson, 
white phosphorus “will burn under water, and actually burn inside the 
body.  It can be a horrible anti-personnel weapon.  The white phosphorus 
will also emit acidy fumes, and the effect of the fumes could be reduced by 
the use of a wet handkerchief over the mouth.”189 
In the same month the Bush Administration approved the use of chem-
icals in combat to save lives, there is evidence that white phosphorus might 
have been used as a prohibited method of warfare to enhance the effects of 
conventional weapons.190  An After Action Report (AAR) from Infantry 
Magazine cites the use of white phosphorus in April 2003 in an artillery 
mortar raid outside Irbil against an entrenched Iraqi Republican Guard 
Battalion.  The report describes that the 60mm mortar’s primary targets 
were personnel and light skinned vehicles.  “The 60mm mortar sections 
emplaced traversing fire on the Iraqi trench line and observation posts.  
The Iraqis in one observation post attempted to flee but were fixed with 
white phosphorus fires.  As they attempted to flee again, white phosphorus 
rounds impacted the vehicle and set it on fire.”191 
Although the report indicates anti-personnel use, it is unclear in this 
particular context that the toxicity of white phosphorus was being used to 
  
 188. Marie Okabe, deputy spokesperson for United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan said: “We 
are aware of the reported use of white phosphorus in Fallujah last year, and are concerned about its 
effects on the local civilian population.  We welcome the decision of the government of Iraq to launch 
an immediate investigation into this matter.”  Elisabeth Schreinemacher, Rights: Vietnamese Agent 
Orange Victims Demand Compensation, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 19, 2005.  Peter Carter, Chairman 
of the Bar’s Human Right’s Committee (U.K.) and international law expert “called for an independent 
inquiry, possibly through the United Nations, into the use of white phosphorus in Iraq.”  Buncombe et 
al., supra note 11. 
 189. Chris Hedges, Salvador Charged with Dropping Incendiary Bombs, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Apr. 27, 1984, at 1.  Commenting after Salvadorian civilians reported that the Salvadorian Air Force 
was dropping white phosphorus bombs on villages, the Salvadorian government denied these accounts.  
The United States supplied the Salvadorian government with white phosphorus; however, according to 
Chris Hedges, U.S. Embassy Spokesman, “[t]he only incendiary device is the white phosphorus rocket 
used to mark an area for bombing.  This rocket can cause a fire in a dry area.”  Id.  
 190. Wade & Schmitt, supra note 86, at 3. 
 191. Levy, supra note 170.  “We fired twenty rounds of high explosive ammunition with proximity 
fuses, then twelve rounds of white phosphorus ammunition.  This produced a catastrophic effect on the 
enemy, equipment, and ammunition contained inside the trench.”  Captain Mathew C. Paul, TF Heavy 
Mortars in a 360-Degree Battlefield, INFANTRY MAG., Jan. 1, 2004, at 17 (emphasis added). 
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drive them from the fortified positions.  However, this tactic is consistent 
with the WWII Chemical Mortar Battalions method and with later, more 
explicit uses of white phosphorus to flush out the enemy trench lines. 
In April 2004 (during the first siege of Fallujah), Darin Mortensen re-
ported from the 2nd Battalion 1st Marines the use of “Shake & Bake.”  
This was described as the firing of white phosphorus and high explosives 
into insurgent positions: 
“Gun up!” Millikin yelled when they finished a few seconds later, 
grabbing a white phosphorus round from a nearby ammo can and 
holding it over the tube.   
“Fire!” Bogert yelled, as Millikin dropped it.   
The boom kicked dust around the pit as they ran through the drill 
again and again, sending a mixture of bursting white phosphorus 
and high explosives they call “Shake & Bake” into a cluster of 
buildings where insurgents have been spotted all week.192 
In November 2004 (during the second siege of Fallujah), an AAR pub-
lished in Field Artillery Magazine described white phosphorus as a “versa-
tile munition”: 
We used [white phosphorus] for screening missions at two 
breeches and, later in the fight, as a potent psychological weapon 
against the insurgents in trench lines and spider holes when we 
could not get effects on them with HE [high explosives].  We fired 
“shake & bake” missions at the insurgents, using WP to flush them 
out and HE to take them out. . . . We used improved WP for 
screening missions when HC smoke would have been more effec-
tive and saved the WP for lethal mission.193 
In November 2004, Toby Harnden from The Sunday Telegraph (U.K.) 
was with Marine Task Force 2-2 and also witnessed this technique: 
But some of the insurgents were not visible and, once commanders 
felt sure that no civilians were present, the call would go up for 
“shake and bake.”  It was a refrain shouted cheerfully because sol-
diers were aware that this meant white phosphorous [sic] being 
dropped to flush out fighters. . . .  
The white phosphorous [sic] shells . . . would then be fired from 
the edge of the city, exploding on houses and sending up huge 
  
 192. Mortenson, supra note 172 (emphasis added). 
 193. Cobb et al., supra note 16, at 26 (emphasis added). 
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plumes of white smoke.  Insurgents would be killed instantly or, 
fleeing the carnage, exposed to sniper fire.194 
The 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, Scout/Sniper Platoon, Section 1 in Fal-
lujah employed this tactic to clear insurgents out of buildings: “A 60 mm 
or 81 mm white phosphorous [sic] mortar round, wrapped three times with 
detonation cord, and a one quarter or one-half stick of C4.  Used when 
contact is made in a house, and the enemy must be burned out.”195 
Interestingly, the November Field Artillery AAR report’s description 
of white phosphorus as a “versatile munition” and “psychological 
weapon,” used to drive the enemy out of holes and trenches appears to 
come right out of the playbook of the Chemical Mortar Battalion.  More-
over, Sergeant Catagnus’s use of improvised white phosphorus bombs to 
flush insurgents out of buildings (in Operation Phantom Fury) seems to 
mirror British commander Col. Tim Collins’s “Shake & Bake” tactic 
where the white phosphorus grenades’ noxious fumes were to be used to 
flush the enemy out of rooms so they could be killed by conventional 
means (in Planned Operation Fury).196 
Perhaps this method of warfare dependent on the toxicity of white 
phosphorus was what a senior officer in charge of 1st Div 2-2 (the unit that 
wrote the Field Artillery AAR) Tactical Operations Command Center 
meant when he told a reporter from the San Francisco Chronicle after sev-
enty percent of the city had been captured: “Usually we keep the gloves on.  
For this operation we took the gloves off.”197 
One could argue that the effect of white phosphorus smoke is harmless 
and meant to confuse entrenched soldiers, compelling them to flee in fear 
and expose themselves to high explosives.  However, this theory fails to 
take account of the known toxic effects of white phosphorus smoke, espe-
cially in enclosed spaces;198 the allergic effects; the noxious smoke; and the 
side benefit of toxicity described by the Russians in Chechnya.  
  
 194. Toby Harnden, I Watched U.S. Use “Shake and Bake,” SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 
20, 2005, at 13 (emphasis added).  “He [would] do what’s called shake and bake missions and he was 
on artillery,” Tina Richards, mother of a Marine who served two tours in Iraq and anti-war protester.  
Weekend America: Get on the Bus (Am. Pub. Media radio broadcast Jan. 27, 2007). 
 195. Catagnus et al., supra note 18, at 88 (emphasis added). 
 196. Operation Fury was canceled and British forces never used the phosphorus grenades.  Colonel 
Collins commented on his forces not using the grenades by saying that “thankfully” his men never had 
to use them.  Rupert Hamer, Brits Trained to Use Hell Bombs, SUNDAY MIRROR (U.K.), Nov. 20, 2005, 
at 2. 
 197. Stannard, supra note 175. 
 198. See 2 SUBCOMM. ON MILITARY SMOKES AND OBSCURANTS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
TOXICITY OF MILITARY SMOKES AND OBSCURANTS 18–44 (1999), available at http://books.nap.edu/ 
openbook.php?record_id=9621&page=18. 
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Moreover, although John Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org, a de-
fense think tank, insists that white phosphorus is not a chemical weapon, 
he nevertheless told National Public Radio that white phosphorus does 
cause “irritation,” but that it goes away “when you leave the smoke.”199  
This need to leave because of irritation caused by the burning white phos-
phorus is precisely how non-lethal toxic chemicals are used in conjunction 
with lethal force to become a prohibited method of warfare.  One flees his 
entrenched position to escape the toxic smoke and then is exposed to high 
explosives.  The CWC prohibits the use of a toxic chemical as a method of 
warfare.200  Even under the narrowest definition and consistent with offi-
cial U.S. policy (RCA in combat only to save lives), the use of white phos-
phorus as an irritant to enhance the effect of lethal force is a clear violation 
of the treaty and a serious felony under section 229A(7)(C) of the CWCIA. 
1. Further Evidence of Criminal Intent: Toxicity as a Necessary Ingre-
dient. 
In 1997, “in light of the probability of future operations in urban envi-
ronments, the [U.S.] Marine Corps Intelligence Activity[] was tasked to 
provide a preliminary assessment of urban warfare lessons learned in sup-
port of the [Close Support End-to-End Assessment] Joint Wargame.”201  
Lessons learned were drawn from Russian, Israeli, and British military 
experiences.  Lesson 34 points out the dual-use of obscurants as toxic gas-
ses202 in urban fighting: 
Lesson 34: Obscurants are especially useful when fighting in cit-
ies.  Russian forces made extensive use of smoke and white phos-
phorus to screen the movement of forces during city fighting.  
Every fourth or fifth Russian artillery round was either smoke or 
white phosphorus.  (The Russians claimed that white phosphorus 
had the added benefits of toxicity, readily penetrated Chechen pro-
tective masks, and was not banned by treaty.)  They also found tear 
gas very useful in Grozny.203 
  
 199. Pentagon Defends, supra note 124. 
 200. See OPCW FACT SHEET, supra note 64. 
 201. MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY, URBAN WARFARE STUDY 1 (1999), available at 
http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/urbancasestudies.pdf. 
 202. It is interesting to note that while U.S. military officials were asserting that the white phosphorus 
smoke used to flush out and kill insurgents was not a violation of the CWC, the Army Times published 
an article on the development of new heater meals (MREs) for U.S. troops.  The army researchers 
developing the new heating system were looking at a mixture of calcium oxide and phosphorus pentox-
ide.  They were concerned about troops being exposed to phosphorus pentoxide because it is “highly 
toxic when inhaled.”  Kelly Kennedy, Hot—But Not Explosive, ARMY TIMES, Dec. 19, 2005, at 6. 
 203. URBAN WARFARE STUDY, supra note 201, at 15. 
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It is unclear why this “lesson learned” would rely on a four-year-old 
Russian treaty interpretation as to the legality of using white phosphorus as 
a toxic gas in urban combat.  It is especially disconcerting given that Dep-
uty Defense Secretary John Deutch addressed the restriction on white 
phosphorus as an RCA in hearings before the Senate Arms Committee 
concerning the ratification of the CWC.  Moreover, the United States be-
came a state party to the CWC on April 25, 1997204 and passed federal 
legislation restricting the use of toxic chemicals by members of the armed 
forces in combat in 1998.  Further, the Russian Federation became a state 
party to the CWC on November 5th, 1997,205 and now publicly declares 
that white phosphorus use as a weapon is a violation of international 
law.206   
This case study compilation was published in 2001 and the information 
cut-off date was February 1, 1999.  It makes no reference to the CWC in its 
white phosphorus recommendation.  These lessons learned were later in-
corporated (in 2002) into the U.S. Doctrine for Urban Operations, a publi-
cation prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff.  It was meant to provide guidance for future urban combat opera-
tions.207  White phosphorus as a beneficial toxic gas in urban fighting—
Lesson 34—was later incorporated into U.S. urban warfare doctrine.  This 
is particularly troubling because toxic chemicals employed as methods of 
warfare are unlawful. 
IV.  REQUIEM 
In the Zyklon B case, the German businessmen claimed that cyanide 
was legitimately used purely for “delousing” and “disinfecting.”  They 
further stated that the gas chambers which they built and repaired were 
only made for those particular purposes.  Zyklon B was only intended for 
legitimate purposes and not as a toxic chemical used to kill human beings.  
How different was that (in principle alone) from the Pentagon’s insistence 
and Teledyne’s position that white phosphorus is used by the military for 
the legitimate purposes of “screening,” “marking,” and “illumination” only 
and not as a toxic chemical used to flush out and kill Iraqis.  While Ameri-
can use of phosphorus and Teledyne’s apparent “lack of knowledge” is not 
  
 204. OPCW Membership, supra note 46. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Russian Parliament Condemns, supra note 106. 
 207. DOCTRINE FOR JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS (2002), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ 
library/policy/dod/doctrine/jp3_06.pdf (while not explicitly citing white phosphorus as a toxic gas, the 
document references the lessons learned from the Marine Urban Case Studies which does describe the 
use of white phosphorus as a toxic gas). 
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even remotely comparable in motivation, fact, or proportion to the geno-
cide at Auschwitz and the complicity of Tesch and Stabenow, the principle 
that dual-use chemicals within the context of enclosed spaces can serve as 
chemical weapons is comparable. 
The juxtaposition of these two instances is neither accidental nor far-
fetched.  The Zyklon B decision was cited and explained by Judge Jack B. 
Weinstein, Senior District Judge for the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York, in In re Agent Orange.208  Moreover, the 
comparison of hydrogen cyanide (Zyklon B), white phosphorus, and their 
legitimate and prohibited uses was made by the Department of Defense 
before the Senate Arms Committee at the time of the ratification of the 
CWC.  It is also important to note that the current chairman of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI), and the current rank-
ing chairman Sen. John Warner (R-VA), were present when white phos-
phorus and its implications under the CWC were discussed.209  It is unclear 
why Senator Levin (D-MI) and Senator Warner (R-VA) have not revisited 
this issue in light of widely reported and internationally condemned white 
phosphorus use.   
Applying the legal standard from the Zyklon B decision: (1) Were 
Iraqis subject to phosphorus pentoxide gas/phosphoric acid?  (2) Did the 
Command supply them with WP?  (3) Did the Command know or should 
have known phosphorus pentoxide/phosphoric acid was being used for 
killing human beings? 
Defendants of the U.S. military’s use of white phosphorus might argue 
that white phosphorus is not a chemical weapon and that it has non-
prohibited uses such as anti-material incendiary, smokescreen, and illumi-
nation.  Principally, this is the same defense the German businessmen pre-
sented in the Zyklon B case—that hydrogen cyanide was not a chemical 
weapon and that it has non-prohibited uses of “disinfecting,”210 “killing 
vermin,”211 and “cleansing.”212   
  
 208. See In re Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 91–94 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 209. CWC Hearing, supra note 136. 
 210. Experiments conducted by Marine Hospital Service in 1888 concluded that burning white phos-
phorus could serve as a general disinfectant.  John Michels, Phosphorus Pentoxide as a Disinfectant, 
12 SCIENCE 109, 109–10 (1888). 
 211. “We cordoned off the roads and built vehicle checkpoints and entrance control points around the 
city.  We cleared the vermin out and did not let them come back.”  Patrecia Slayden Hollis, Second 
Battle of Fallujah, FIELD ARTILLERY MAG., Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 4 (quoting Lt. Gen. John F. Sattler, 
commander of U.S. Marine Forces, Central Command). 
 212. “We are determined to clean Falluja from terrorists,” stated Interim Iraqi President Allawi as he 
gave the green light for Coalition Forces to enter Fallujah in November 2004.  Battle for Fallujah 
Underway, CNN, Nov. 9, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/11/08/iraq.main (emphasis 
added). 
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White phosphorus was used as an irritant to drive Iraqis from trenches 
so they could be killed.  This is a prohibited method of warfare and makes 
white phosphorus a chemical weapon only in those circumstances.  For 
both Zyklon B and the use of white phosphorus in Fallujah and elsewhere 
in Iraq, the actual purpose, not the legitimate purpose, is the dispositive 
issue in determining the legal status of a chemical.   
There are real consequences in not holding the Bush Administration 
and other parties accountable for their use of chemicals in Iraq.  Inaction 
on the part of the people of the United States and the international commu-
nity in addressing this issue will inevitably set a new international legal 
precedent.  Professor Julian Perry Robinson, an expert on the CWC con-
vention, responded to the Bush Administration’s decision to use chemicals 
in combat in 2003 by saying: “When the war is over and these things have 
been used they will be legitimized as a tool of war, and the principle of 
toxic weapons being banned will have gone.”213   
Currently, John Conyers (D-MI), the Chairman of the House Judiciary 
Committee, is assembling a report on the false intelligence that led to the 
war in Iraq and the allegations of war crimes committed by the present 
administration.  The congressman’s report states that white phosphorus is 
not covered under the CWC.214  This is not accurate.  It was the position of 
the Department of Defense at the time of the treaty’s ratification that white 
phosphorus was part of the convention.  Moreover, it is the position of the 
OPCW that white phosphorus is banned under the CWC if it is used for its 
toxic properties to kill human beings.215  
In December 2006, U.S. House Representative Cynthia McKinney (D-
GA), introduced House Resolution 1106, initiating articles of impeachment 
against George Walker Bush and other officials.  House Resolution 1106 
lists the use of illegal weapons as a “failure to ensure the laws are faithfully 
executed.”  Representative McKinney specifically cited and entered into 
the Congressional Record that the “deployment of white phosphorus [was] 
a violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.”216 
The scale of this toxic precedent is ambiguous and largely unknown.  
In 2003, The Independent (U.K.) reported that internal documents from the 
Pentagon showed that the United States is developing a range of calmative 
gases, including sedatives such as “benzodiazepines . . . and new drugs that 
  
 213. Geoffrey Lean & Severin Carrell, U.S. Prepares to Use Toxic Gases in Iraq, INDEP. SUNDAY 
(London), Mar. 2, 2003, at 18. 
 214. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM. DEMOCRATIC STAFF, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS 102 (2007) (pre-
pared at the direction of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.), available at http://www.afterdowningstreet. 
org/constitutionincrisis. 
 215. Reynolds, supra note 7. 
 216. 153 CONG. REC. E2254 (daily ed. Dec. 27, 2006) (statement of Rep. McKinney). 
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affect the nervous system.”217  In 2005, Mohammed Tareq al Deraji, direc-
tor of the Research Center for Defense of Human Rights in Fallujah, told 
RAI news that residents in Fallujah reportedly were seen falling asleep 
during the siege and that one former Iraqi Army Officer described the gas 
being used as “smelling like apples.”218   
The actual extent of the Bush Administration’s use of chemicals in the 
Iraq war is unknown.  An investigation into the American use of white 
phosphorus in Fallujah was announced by Iraqi Humans Rights Minister 
Narmin Othman in November 2005.219  The sovereign government of Iraq 
then halted the investigation a week later without publishing any findings.  
Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, explained that Iraq “[has no] right 
to judge the U.S. usage of that [white phosphorus] or any other weapon.”220  
This is particularly startling since the Iraqi government seems to suggest 
that the American military is not subject to the universal obligations of 
international humanitarian law.  
Regrettably, there exists no present forum to judge the use of chemi-
cals in combat by the United States in Iraq.221  Moreover, the Pentagon’s 
deliberate avoidance to specifically address the legality of “Shake & Bake” 
operations puts American enlisted and commissioned personnel at unnec-
essary risk for potential liability under the laws of war, CWC, and 
CWCIA.  Lastly, the legal precedent this current forum will set for domes-
tic and international law and for the future of toxic chemicals in combat 
remains uncertain.   
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I will kill them all with chemical weapons!  Who is going to say 
anything?  The international community?  Fuck them!  [T]he inter-
national community, and those who listen to them!222 
As military professionals, it is important that we take time to re-
flect on the values that separate us from our enemies.  The chal-
lenge for us is to make sure the actions of the few do not tarnish 
the good work of the many.223 
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